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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The front page caption contains the names of all parties involved in this dispute. 
Only plaintiffs and defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. are parties to this appeal. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0). 
ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW & PRESERVATION 
Issue: Did the trial court err in failing to grant Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that Hanson owed no duty of care, that Hanson's repair was not 
the proximate cause of Normandeau's death, and that Normandeau was negligent in his 
preparation of the truck for towing? 
Standard of Review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate 
court reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is 
entitled to summary judgment presents a question of law and the appellate court grants no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
Preservation: Hanson preserved this issue by filing a motion for summary 
judgment located in the record at 612-748. 
Issue: Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury regarding ITEC's 
negligent design of the truck's hydraulic system which caused the parking brake to 
engage and resulted in the presence of torque in the driveline? 
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Standard of Review: Challenges to jury instructions are reviewed under a 
correctness standard. See Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998). 
Preservation: Hanson preserved its objection to the trial court's failure to give this 
jury instruction in the record at 2077, pp. 2-3. 
Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to strike plaintiffs' untimely 
designation of an expert witness who was used to create issues of fact in opposing 
Hanson's timely and properly supported motion for summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court properly rules on pre-trial compliance 
with a scheduling order is review under an abuse of discretion standard. See A.K.&R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah 1999). In some 
instances, however, pre-trial rulings regarding timely disclosure of evidence do present 
questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. See Roundy v. Staley 1999 UT App 
229, p, 984 P.2d 404. 
Preservation: Hanson moved to strike plaintiffs' untimely designation in the 
Record at 1055-1099 and preserved the issue for appeal. 
Issue: Did plaintiffs' counsel make improper closing arguments, which require a 
new trial? 
Standard of Review: Whether plaintiffs' counsel made improper remarks 
warranting a new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Child v. 
Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998). 
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Preservation: Hanson objected to counsel's argument. (R. at 1738-39, 1747) To 
the extent Hanson failed to object to the improper closing argument, the error was plain 
and obvious to the trial court. Moreover, Hanson requested in its post-trial motion for a 
new trial based on the improper closing argument. (R. at 1692-1800) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In Charles Dickens' novel Bleak House, he wrote of corruption in the legal 
system by reference to an endless case, stating: "Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on." To 
say this case rivals Jarndyce and Jarndyce would vastly overstate its pendency before the 
trial court. Nevertheless, to suggest that the parties had ample time to work up their case 
would not be an overstatement. Although this case went to trial before a jury, this appeal 
presents issues relating to the orderly, expeditious, and fair handling of scheduling 
deadlines and summary judgment. 
In this case, plaintiffs should not have been allowed to present their case to 
the jury. Despite ample time to prepare their case, plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence at 
the close of fact and expert discovery to impose liability on Hanson. The trial court erred 
in allowing this case to reach the jury. Furthermore, in addition to failing to grant 
Hanson's motion for summary judgment, the trial court issued a series of rulings which 
deprived Hanson of a fair opportunity to present its case at trial. The jury heard skewed 
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evidence in favor of plaintiffs and were not properly instructed as to the governing law. 
As a result, a jury inflamed by improper closing remarks awarded plaintiffs a substantial 
verdict on a case that should have been resolved at summary judgment. 
This is not a case where Hanson was seeking to prevail on technicalities or 
to deprive plaintiffs of recovery without the opportunity to present the merits of their 
case. Plaintiffs were given every opportunity to develop their case, present the necessary 
experts, and then put their cards on the table. In the end, plaintiffs' evidence was 
insufficient to overcome Hanson's motion for summary judgment. Not all accidents, 
regardless of the severity or tragedy, are the fault of another. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Accident 
This lawsuit arises from the death of tow-truck driver Dennis Normandeau. 
Normandeau died on November 10, 2001, during the process of preparing to tow a Ryder 
moving truck that had broken down at the side of the road while atop Soldier Summit in 
Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah. (R. at 619) 
Normandeau's Training & Experience 
Earlier in 2001, Normandeau started working for Kenworth Sales Company, 
a diesel maintenance and repair shop and towing service. (R. at 620) Normandeau had 
applied and was hired because of his experience as a mechanic. (R. at 620) About 5 or 6 
months prior to accident, Normandeau's employer had changed his duties to include 
being the primary wrecker driver in addition to his duties as a mechanic. (R. at 620) 
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Because Normandeau had no experience in operating a large diesel 
wrecker, his employer provided his training. Normandeau's supervisor at Kenworth, 
Kyle Bundy, who had twenty years' wrecking experience, taught Normandeau how to use 
a large diesel wrecker. (R. at 620) This training, however, was limited to four supervised 
towing trips. During these supervised trips, Normandeau learned the following important 
aspects of towing large industrial trucks: 
• in order to avoid damaging a truck's transmission, the truck's driveline 
must be disengaged, or "dropped," prior to towing the truck; 
• frequently when trucks break down, torque will occur in the truck's 
driveline; 
• prior to dropping the driveline, it is necessary to check the driveline to 
determine if torque is present; 
• if the driveline is not loose, then the torque needs to be relieved by jacking 
up the back tire or putting the transmission in neutral; (R. at 620-21) 
Mr. Bundy watched Normandeau disassemble a driveline using these 
procedures on three or four occasions. (R. at 620-21) On average, Noramandeau towed 
vehicles similar to the Ryder truck three to five times a month. (R. at 621) Mr. Bundy 
testified it's "Basic Mechanics 101" for wrecker drivers to try to wiggle the driveline to 
check whether or not it has torque or tension, and if so, to put the truck in neutral and 
raise the rear tires before dropping the driveline. (R. at 621) Mr. Bundy testified that if a 
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driveline doesn't wiggle, there is no way to quantify how much torque has built up in it, 
whether it be 100 pounds or 10,000 pounds of pressure. (R. at 621) 
Hanson's Repair of the Hydraulic Hose 
Defendant Hanson Equipment is in the business of servicing and repairing 
trucks, including the model involved in this case. (R. at 621) On November 8, 2001, 
Hanson repaired a hydraulic hose in the Ryder truck's hydraulic system. (R. at 621) The 
next day, Kristen Marion rented the truck and planned to drive it to Silverdale, 
Washington, where she was moving her family. (R. at 622) 
On November 10, 2001, en route to Washington, and while atop Soldier 
Summit in Spanish Fork Canyon, one of the truck's hydraulic lines failed, and Ms. 
Marion slowly pulled the truck off to the side of the road without incident. (R. at 622) 
Ms. Marion contacted Ryder Roadside Assistance, who initially dispatched tow-truck 
driver Larry Freeman to the scene. (R. at 622) When Mr. Freeman arrived, he realized 
that his tow truck was too small to pull the Ryder truck. (R. at 622) Nonetheless, Mr. 
Freeman thought he might be able to fix the truck, so he removed a hose that appeared to 
be dripping power steering fluid. Also, he called various repair shops to find a 
replacement hose, but was unable to find one. (R. at 622) Since he was unable to replace 
the hose, Kenworth was dispatched to bring a large diesel wrecker to tow the truck. 
Kenworth sent wrecker driver Normandeau. (R. at 623) 
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Design of Ryder Truck and Cause of Torque 
In order to understand the forces which caused the accident, it is necessary 
to understand how this particular Ryder truck was designed. Plaintiffs' expert described 
the design of the Ryder truck's hydraulic system and how it engaged as follows: 
• the Ryder truck used a hydraulic system where the power steering, power 
brakes and parking brake use hydraulic pressure supplied from the same system; 
• when the hydraulic system is functioning properly, the parking brake is 
released because hydraulic pressure prevents the brake from engaging; 
• when one of the hydraulic hoses failed, the hydraulic system leaked which 
caused the following to occur: the power steering ceased to operate and the parking brake 
engaged "as an emergency measure to stop the truck" (R. at 808-09); 
• "[bjecause the truck now had to be towed, the driveline had to be 
disengaged from the rear drive wheels so as not to damage the transmission of the truck" 
(R. at 809); 
• "[a]s a result of the driveline parking brake clamping down on the driveline 
when the hydraulic line failed, substantial unseen torque was created in the truck 
driveline" (R. at 809); 
• "[t]his built-up torque is what caused the catastrophic failure of the metal 
yoke connecting the rear of the driveline to the truck's rear axle as Mr. Normandeau was 
beginning to remove the third of four bolts in the yoke/driveline connection" (R. at 808-
09). 
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As plaintiffs' expert discussed, in order to tow the truck, Normandeau had 
to disconnect the driveline. (R. at 623, 809) To disconnect the driveline, Normandeau's 
supervisor trained Normandeau to first check for and to relieve any torque. (R. at 620-21, 
623) Instead of checking for any torque, Normandeau started to remove the four bolts 
from the yoke that connects the driveline to the rear differential. (R. at 623) 
Unfortunately, torque had built up in the driveline, and when Normandeau had removed 
the third bolt only about an eighth of an inch, the driveline broke free, suddenly striking 
Normandeau in the head, killing him. (R. at 623) 
After the Accident 
After the police arrived, another tow truck driver, Landon Jacobson, was 
called to the scene to finish towing the truck. Mr. Jacobson never learned why the truck 
was being towed; nonetheless, he towed the truck, using Normandeau's wrecker, without 
incident. (R. at 624) Mr. Jacobson, who had five years' towing experience, testified that 
before a tow he always checks the driveline to see if there is any built-up tension in it 
before he disassembles it. (R. at 624) When Mr. Jacobson was asked his opinion 
regarding why this accident happened, he testified "obviously there was pressure on the 
driveline, so I guess that wasn't checked...." (R. at 624) When asked if he had ever read 
that built-up tension in a driveline can kill you, Mr. Jacobson replied, "It is just kind 
of-for mechanics, mechanic everyday kind of knowledge, I guess." (R. at 624) 
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Normandeau's supervisor, Mr. Bundy, a wrecker driver of twenty years, 
believes Normandeau made a mistake by not first trying to release and unload the 
pressure that was built-up in the driveline before he attempted to disassemble it. (R. at 
625) When Mr. Bundy was asked, "[W]ho, other than Mr. Normandeau would be 
responsible for his accident?" He answered: "Nobody I know." (R. at 625) 
Claims 
In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs alleged only one theory of liability 
against defendant Hanson Equipment: that Hanson negligently repaired the truck, which 
caused it "to break down under circumstances that required it to be towed." (R. at 181-
194) 
Procedural Details of Case 
As plaintiffs' counsel pointedly remarked to the jury during closing 
argument, "[t]his case is four years old." (R. at 1740) Indeed, plaintiffs filed their 
complaint on December 10, 2002, over a year after the accident occurred. (R. at 1-15) 
The case was tried to a jury over five days, starting on January 30, 2006. During the four 
years the case was pending and the five years between when the accident occurred and 
when the case went trial, both parties were afforded the opportunity to conduct fact and 
expert discovery. 
Initially, all fact discovery was to be completed by December 31, 2004. (R. 
at 345) Plaintiffs' expert designation date was set for October 29, 2004. (R. at 346) 
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When October 29th rolled around, plaintiffs had not yet designated any experts. On April 
5, 2005, the scheduling order was amended and a trial date was set. (R. at 593-97) Fact 
discovery was extended until April 30, 2005, and plaintiffs were given additional time to 
designate their expert witnesses, to March 31, 2005. (R.at 594) The trial was set for 
October 11-21, 2005. (R. at 595) Due to the extension provided to plaintiffs to designate 
their experts and file expert reports, Hanson was allowed the opportunity to file an 
affidavit of fees and costs which were related to this extension. (R. at 595) 
On March 30, 2005, plaintiffs timely designated Rodney E. Andrews as an 
expert and provided his expert report. (R. at 1086-89) Mr. Andrews is a mechanic and 
offered opinions relating to Hanson's repair of the hydraulic hose and an evaluation of the 
reason for the failure of the hose. (R. at 1087) On March 31, 2005, plaintiffs timely 
designated Rudy Limpert as an expert and provided his expert report. (R. at 1091-93) 
Mr. Limpert is a mechanical engineer who specializes in accident reconstruction and 
product liability analysis. (R. at 1092) Mr. Limpert offered opinions relating to how the 
truck's hydraulic system operated and the effect on the hydraulic braking system when a 
hydraulic hose failed. (R. at 1092-93) 
Based on plaintiffs' expert reports, Hanson decided not to designate an 
expert. (R. at 1120) Instead, based on the fact discovery completed and plaintiffs' 
experts' reports, Hanson timely filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 612-748) 
Hanson's motion was not supported by any of its own expert testimony; rather, it solely 
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referred to deposition testimony of fact witnesses and plaintiffs' own experts. (R. at 619-
625) Hanson's motion argued that plaintiffs could not establish a duty of care or 
proximate cause. (R. at 626-634) Additionally, Hanson argued that Normandeau was 
contributorily negligent by failing to check for torque in the truck's driveline. (R. at 634-
637) 
In opposition to Hanson's motion, plaintiffs filed affidavits from its 
previously designated experts, Andrews and Limpert. (R. at 802-05, 806-11) In addition 
to these experts, plaintiffs also submitted an affidavit from a previously undisclosed 
"towing" expert, Jesse A. Enriquez. (R. at 812-16) Mr. Enriquez offered expert opinion 
regarding Normandeau's skill and experience, the Ryder truck's hydraulic system, the 
dangers the hydraulic system posed because of the manner in which the parking brake 
engaged, and the proper manner in which to prepare a truck for towing. (R. at 813-14). In 
summary, Mr. Enriquez testified that Normandeau could not have appreciated the torque 
that had built up in the truck's driveline or the dangers associated with drivelines of this 
type, and therefore, Mr. Enriquez opined that Normandeau exercised the requisite skill 
and care and was not negligent. (R. at 813-14) 
Because plaintiffs' designation of Mr. Enriquez was untimely and designed 
to improperly create issues of fact in opposition to Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment, Hanson moved to strike the untimely designation of Mr. Enriquez. (R. at 1055-
99) Although this case involves the death of a tow truck driver while he was preparing a 
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truck for towing, plaintiffs opposed Hanson's motion to strike, arguing the following: (1) 
Mr. Enriquez was a "rebuttal" expert; and (2) proper towing procedures were not an issue 
in the case until Hanson's motion for summary judgment and its notice of intent to 
apportion fault to Normandeau's employer. (R. at 1118-22) In an Order dated October 
24, 2005, the trial court denied Hanson's motion to strike the untimely designated expert. 
(R. at 1182-84) Additionally, the trial court denied Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment without providing any basis for its denial. (R. at 1182-84) 
Prior to trial, plaintiffs submitted a motion in limine to preclude the opinion 
testimony of Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker who had trained and observed 
Normandeau in preparing to tow trucks. (R. at 1363-87) Plaintiffs' motion argued that 
supervisor Kyle Bundy and co-worker Landon Jacobson should not be allowed to offer 
opinion testimony about why the accident occurred because such testimony lacked 
foundation and was speculative. (R. at 1367) In opposing plaintiffs' motion in limine, 
Hanson designated both Mr. Bundy and Mr. Jacobson as expert witnesses. (R. at 1401-03) 
Hanson opposed plaintiffs' motion in limine on the grounds that Mr. Bundy's and Mr. 
Jacobson's testimony was admissible as expert testimony, that plaintiffs were not 
surprised by either witness's testimony - as both had been deposed and designated as trial 
witnesses, and that both witnesses had a sufficient basis to offer their opinions at trial. (R. 
at 1404-27) Although the trial court had allowed plaintiffs' untimely designation of a 
previously undisclosed expert witness who lacked personal knowledge regarding 
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Normandeau's training, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion in limine and precluded 
both witnesses from offering any opinions at trial. (R. at 1475; see also R. at 2076, p.40 
(wherein plaintiffs' counsel objects to question on basis of motion in limine)). 
Inflammatory and Prejudicial Closing Statement 
Plaintiffs' counsel began his closing argument by repeated references to his 
clients' financial situation. Counsel employed a reverse commentary tactic in which he 
suggested that plaintiffs did not need the jury's sympathy or a monetary award. Counsel 
devoted seven pages of argument transcript to a discussion of the fact that Normandeau's 
wife, Emily, is a poor school teacher with children and that Hanson is a corporation. (R. 
at 1723-30) 
After arousing the jury's sympathy towards his clients' financial plight, 
plaintiffs' counsel moved on to other improper arguments in his closing. Plaintiffs' 
counsel discussed the credibility of witnesses stating that plaintiffs were honest and have 
integrity whereas the other witnesses did not have these traits. (R. at 1791-93). 
Furthermore, plaintiffs' counsel crossed the line and called one witness a liar. (R. at 1784) 
In addition to these personal commentaries on the credibility and moral 
standing of the parties and witnesses, plaintiffs counsel made repeated references to the 
fact that Hanson is a corporation without a defense. He repeatedly refered to the fact that 
Hanson did not bring live fact witnesses and that the president of Hanson did not testify in 
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the case. (R. at 1746-47) The import of these remarks was that Hanson had nothing to say 
for itself and was hiding facts from the jury. 
Finally, in his rebuttal, plaintiffs' counsel again crossed the line by making 
references to Hanson's defense. He refered to counsel directly and suggested that 
Hanson's conduct and defense was pathetic and its counsel was trying to confuse the jury 
with irrelevant facts. (R. at 1740-41, 1782-83, 1790-91, 1793). He concluded his closing 
arguments by reminding the jury that Hanson was pathetic while plaintiffs were honest 
and had integrity. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Due to subsequent and intervening causes, Hanson owed Normandeau no 
duty of care and it was not the proximate cause of his death. Furthermore, Normandeau's 
own acts in failing to check for the presence of torque in the truck's driveline was 
negligent, cutting off any liability on Hanson's part. The trial court erred in denying 
Hanson's motion for summary judgment on these issues. Furthermore, the trial court 
erred in allowing plaintiffs to produce new evidence in the form of an undisclosed expert 
witness in order to defeat Hanson's motion. 
Subsequently, the trial court compounded its errors and created a landscape 
at trial that favored plaintiffs and deprived the jury of hearing the most probative witness 
testimony on a key issue in the case. Finally, the trial court allowed plaintiffs' counsel, 
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over Hanson's objections, to make improper closing argument that inflamed the jury, 
aroused the jury's sympathy, and resulted in an unsupportable jury award. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Hanson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
As plaintiffs' expert discussed, the reason torque built up in the truck's 
driveline was because the parking brake engaged. (R. at 809) The reason the parking 
brake engaged when the hydraulic system lost pressure was because that was how the 
truck's hydraulic system was designed to operate. In other words, the failure of a 
hydraulic hose would not cause the parking brake to engage absent ITEC designing the 
system to operate in that manner. The parking brake engaged as an emergency failsafe 
because a hydraulic failure also affected the power steering and the truck's brakes. 
Even with the parking brake engaged and torque present in the truck's 
driveline, the accident still could have and should have been avoided. All wreckers of 
large trucks know the following: (1) when a large truck breaks down, its driveline needs 
to be dropped prior to towing to prevent damage to the transmission; (2) the presence of 
torque in the driveline is a distinct and likely possibility; and (3) it is necessary to check 
the driveline for torque and to relieve any torque that may be present. Thus, although the 
design of the truck's failsafe emergency system caused the parking brake to engage, the 
accident was still avoidable if the torque was eliminated prior to removing the bolts that 
secured the truck's driveline. Based on these two circumstances, the trial court erred by 
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finding as a matter of law that Hanson: (A) owed a duty of care to Normandeau; and (B) 
Hanson's repair of the Ryder truck was the proximate cause of Normandeau's death. 
Finally, absent an undisclosed expert, plaintiffs could not refute that Normandeau's 
contributory negligence cut off any liability from Hanson's repair. 
A. A Truck Repair Company Owes No Duty of Care to a 
Subsequent Repairman. 
In order to owe a duty of care, Normandeau's inability to comprehend the 
torque created by the Ryder truck's design would need to be foreseeable to Hanson. 
"'One essential element of a negligence action is a duty of reasonable care owed to the 
plaintiff by [the] defendant. Absent a showing of duty, [the plaintiff] cannot recover.'" 
Slisze v. Stanlev-Bostitch. 1999 UT 20,1f9, 979 P.2d 317. A duty has been described as 
"a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of a particular 
plaintiff." Ferree v. State of Utah. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (quotation omitted). 
Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court, reviewed for correctness. See 
AMS Salt Indus.. Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America. 942 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997) 
(citations omitted). 
In Utah, although foreseeability is not determinative, it is one of the factors 
used to determine the existence of a duty of care: "[W]hether the law imposes a duty 
does not depend upon foreseeability alone. The likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the 
burden of guarding against it and the consequences of placing that burden upon 
defendant, must also be taken into account." AMS Salt Indus.. Inc.. 942 P.2d at 321 
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(quoting Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 54-55 (Utah 1983)). 
Whether a duty is owed "requires a careful consideration of the consequences for the 
parties and society at large." Beach v. Universitv of Utah. 726 P.2d 413,418 (Utah 1986). 
In its ruling, the trial court concluded that Hanson owed Normandeau a duty of care; 
however, its Order discloses no basis or reasoning for its legal conclusion. (R. at 1182-84) 
As discussed, one of the principle factors that establishes a general duty of 
care is foreseeability. Should Hanson have foreseen that a negligent repair of a hydraulic 
hose would lead to the injury of a tow truck driver who did not appreciate how the Ryder 
truck's hydraulic braking system worked and the dangers inherent in such a braking 
system because the parking brake automatically engaged? Furthermore, should Hanson 
have reasonably foreseen that a tow truck driver would fail to take a known and 
reasonable precaution to check for and relieve torque in the truck's driveline? The 
answer to both questions is no. As such, Hanson owed no general duty of care to an 
unforeseen tow truck driver called to tow the Ryder truck when one of its hydraulic hoses 
failed. See, e.g., Reimer v. City of Crookston. 326 F.3d 957, 965 (8th Cir. 2003) (fact 
that on occasion defendant would do work on boiler does not create a duty on its part to 
anyone down the line who may be harmed by the boiler). 
In contrast to the trial court's finding of a legal duty owed to Normandeau, 
plaintiffs'counsel, during his closing argument, accurately identified those people who 
were reasonably foreseeable to Hanson and to whom Hanson owed a duty of care: "it is 
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negligent to put it out in a permanent return to service setting where a woman and her 
children are renting the vehicle and driving over a thousand miles." (R. at 1735, see also 
R. at 1737) In other words, had the driver of the truck been injured when the hydraulic 
hose failed because she lost control of the truck, it is reasonable to say that Hanson could 
have foreseen that its negligence might result in the truck's driver being injured while the 
truck was in use. Once the truck was safely pulled over to the side of the road without 
incident, however, Hanson's liability for its repair was cut-off at that point. The 
subsequent events that transpired while Normandeau prepared to tow the truck were not 
foreseeable to Hanson and were not a basis for finding Hanson owed a duty of care to 
Normandeau. The trial court erred in denying Hanson's motion for summary judgment 
on the legal issue of a general duty of care. 
B. Hanson's Repairs Were Not the Proximate Cause of the 
Accident. 
Hanson's repair of one of the Ryder truck's hydraulic hoses was not the 
proximate cause of Normandeau's inability to properly prepare the truck for towing or his 
inability to recognize the presence of torque in the truck's driveline. Under Utah law, the 
proximate cause of an injury "is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
(unbroken by efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the 
result would not have occurred." Bansasine v. Bodell 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) (citations omitted). This Court has stated: "a trial court may rule as a matter of law 
on the issue if: \\) there is no evidence to establish a causal connection, thus leaving 
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causation to jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable persons could not differ on the 
inferences to be derived from the evidence on proximate causation.'" Id. (citations 
omitted). 
Plaintiffs' theory on causation is too attenuated to allow reasonable persons 
to differ on the inferences derived from the evidence, and thus, it fails as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs' theory is as follows: 
(1) Hanson negligently repaired a hydraulic hose; 
(2) due to Hanson's negligent repair, the hydraulic hose failed while the truck was 
being driven; 
(3) because the hydraulic hose failed, the truck's parking brake engaged thereby 
effectively disabling the truck; 
(4) as the truck came to a stop and because the parking brake automatically 
engaged, torque built up in the truck's driveline; 
(5) because the truck was disabled, it needed to be towed; 
(6) the first tow truck driver to arrive on the scene removed the hydraulic hose and 
thereby removed any path by which the parking brake could be released; 
(7) even experienced tow-truck drivers were not familiar with this truck's 
hydraulic braking system, were not aware that this model truck used this braking system, 
and were not aware of the dangers that this braking system posed; 
19 
(8) when Normandeau arrived on the scene and was preparing the track to be 
towed, he was unable to appreciate the amount of torque that was present in the track's 
driveline; 
(9) failing to appreciate the presence of torque, Normandeau proceeded to remove 
the bolts on the track's driveline in order to tow the track without damaging the 
transmission; and 
(10) while Normandeau was removing the bolts, torque in the track's driveline 
caused the driveline to whip, striking his head and killing him instantly. 
Plaintiffs argue this chain of facts demonstrated that fact number 1 was the 
proximate cause of fact number 10, and thus the trial court properly denied Hanson's 
motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs' theory, however, leaves out key facts that effectively break this 
causal chain. First, plaintiffs' theory omits that the parking brake engaged because the 
track was designed to have the brake engage as an emergency failsafe whenever the 
hydraulic system lost pressure. (R. at 1742-43) Second, plaintiffs' theory omits that in 
most cases when a large truck breaks down torque occurs in the drive line. (R. at 1745, 
1788) 
Neither party disputes that the track was disabled and the parking brake 
engaged because of the design of the track. Furthermore, torque built-up in the driveline 
because that is what happens when a truck breaks down. (R. at 1788) To the extent an 
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excessive amount of torque built up, it was due to the design of the truck which caused 
the parking break to engage when the truck detected a drop in the pressure of the 
hydraulic system. (R. at 809, 1742-43) In other words, the truck performed as it was 
designed. (R. at 1742-45) Hanson did not design the truck. (R. at 1743) In terms of a 
liability time line, Hanson's liability for its repair of the hydraulic hose was cut-off once 
the truck was safely parked on the side of the road. At that point, Hanson's repair of the 
hydraulic hose was the proximate cause of the truck being disabled; however, its repairs 
were not the proximate cause of the torque or Normandeau's failure to appreciate the 
presence of torque. Finally, Hanson's repair was not the proximate cause of Normandeau 
failing to relieve the torque. 
"It is a well-settled principle that when [a] defendant's negligence merely 
creates a condition by which the subsequent injury producing acts of another are made 
possible, the existence of the first condition cannot be the proximate cause of the injury." 
Crull v. Piatt, 471 N.E.2d 1211,1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (defective wiring created the 
condition requiring repair, but negligent repair and failure of repairman to reconnect the 
propane lines was the proximate cause of the explosion). Similarly, Hanson may have 
created the condition requiring a tow truck, but it did not design the hydraulic system that 
created the torque in the driveline and it did not cause Normandeau to fail to relieve the 
driveline torque before removing the bolts securing the driveline. 
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Thus, both the truck's design and Normandeau's failure to check for 
torque are intervening causes which break the causal chain. As such, fact number 1 did 
not cause fact number 10. Hanson was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of 
proximate cause. 
C. Without Enriquez's opinions, Plaintiffs Offered No Evidence to 
Oppose Normandeau's Contributory Negligence. 
Plaintiffs relied on Jesse Enriquez's opinions to argue that Normandeau 
could not have appreciated the dangers posed by the Ryder truck's hydraulic system and 
therefore was not negligent in preparing to drop the truck's driveline. Had the trial court 
granted Hanson's motion to strike, plaintiffs could not have opposed Hanson's motion for 
summary judgment with respect to Normandeau's own negligence. 
As discussed, the design of the truck's hydraulic system created the 
dangerous condition of torque in the truck's driveline. In similar circumstances involving 
a defective condition necessitating repair, other jurisdictions have held, as a matter of 
law, that the repairman was the intervening, superceding cause of his own injuries. See 
Barati v. Aero Industries, 579 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991) (although defective 
condition created the situation, it was the repairman's improvident choice of method of 
repair that was the intervening cause of injuries); Crull v. Piatt. 471 N.E.2d 1211 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1985) (defective condition was not the proximate cause where intervening 
repairman forgot to reconnect the gas line which caused explosion and injury). 
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Prior to dropping the driveline, all experts, including Mr. Enriquez (R. at 
813), and all witnesses in the case stated that the wrecker driver must check for torque. 
(R. at 809, 813, 1751) Mr. Enriquez opined that perhaps Normandeau was in the process 
of checking for torque when the driveline whipped. (R. at 814, 1751, 1788-89) 
Furthermore, Mr. Enriquez opined that because nobody could have appreciated the 
amount of torque that had built-up in the driveline, Normandeau's actions were non-
negligent. (R. at 814) Without this testimony, however, plaintiffs had no other evidence 
to demonstrate that Normandeau was not negligent in failing to relieve the torque prior to 
removing the driveline bolts. Furthermore, because all experts agree that torque caused 
the driveline to whip, it is reasonable to infer that Normandeau failed to relieve the torque 
prior to dropping the driveline. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Hanson's 
motion to strike and in denying Hanson's motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
contributory negligence. 
II. The Trial Court's Failure to Instruct the Jury Regarding ITEC's 
Negligent Design Was Error. 
By failing to grant Hanson's motion for summary judgment and then 
refusing to give Hanson's proposed jury instruction on negligent design, the trial court 
allowed the jury to hear confusing evidence, which absent a proper instruction, led to the 
unsupported jury verdict which found Hanson was the only proximate cause of 
Normandeau's injury. Specifically, Hanson requested that the jury be instructed on law 
regarding negligent design and also that truck's manufacturer, ITEC, be listed on the 
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special verdict form as a possible negligent party and intervening cause. Consistent with 
the argument in points B & C above, Hanson believed the negligent design of the truck's 
hydraulic system set forth the chain of events that caused the build up of torque when the 
truck's parking brake engaged and ultimately resulted in Normandeau's death. 
Hanson submitted MUJI 12.16 and requested that the instruction be given to 
the jury. MUJI 12.16 provides: "Negligence - Duty of Manufacturer: The manufacturer 
of a product that is reasonably certain to be dangerous if negligently made has a duty to 
exercise reasonable care in the design of the product, so that the product may be safely 
used in a manner and for a purpose for which it was made." Hanson argued the jury 
should be instructed that liability could be imposed on ITEC for negligently designing the 
truck's failsafe system which created the excessive torque in the truck's drive line. 
In a moment of agreement between plaintiffs and Hanson, both parties were 
taken by surprise when the trial court called in the jury without further discussion of jury 
instructions or the special verdict form. (R. at 2077 at pp. 2, 5 ("Plaintiff joins defendant's 
exception as to how the final instruction were tendered to Counsel.")) Both counsel 
objected to the trial court's handling of the jury instructions and special verdict. (R. at 
2077 at pp. 2, 5) Thus, instead of instructing the jury that ITEC could be found negligent, 
the jury was only instructed as to strict liability. (R. at 1754) 
As discussed in the context of an intervening cause, the design of the ITEC 
truck's hydraulic braking system was a substantial factor in causing Normandeau's death. 
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Both parties provided evidence that when the hydraulic hose failed, the truck performed 
as it was designed to do, which meant the parking brake engaged. (R. at 1743) Indeed, 
plaintiffs offered expert testimony regarding the dangers inherent in the truck's design. 
Mr. Enriquez's affidavit stated: (1) he was not aware that tow operators were placing 
themselves at a risk of danger while working on this type of truck; (2) that this type of 
truck design was a "stick of dynamite;" and (3) the truck contains no warnings. (R. at 
814) At trial, he reiterated that Normandeau had no way to appreciate the hazard he 
faced, that the torque created in this case was beyond what he had seen in his experience, 
and that ITEC could have done more to prevent this accident. (R. at 2075, at p. #4, 18, 27) 
Additionally, plaintiffs' expert, Rudy Limpert corroborated Mr. Enriquez's 
testimony about the dangers inherent in ITEC's design. Mr. Limpert testified that 
disengaging the driveline on models like the ITEC used in this Ryder truck "is a very 
dangerous mechanical operation not easily recognized as such." (R. at 2074, p.l 17, 136) 
Mr. Limpert indicated the truck contained no warnings to put a tow operator on notice of 
the potential hazard. (R. at 2074, p. 119, 120) Mr. Limpert stated he believed it would be 
a good idea for ITEC to provide some sort of warning about the potential hazards inherent 
in the design of the truck. (R. at 2074, p. 121-22) Indeed, plaintiffs asserted a negligent 
design theory against ITEC, which was settled prior to trial. (R. at 2074, p. 125) Mr. 
Limpert stated the biggest problem with the ITEC design is that the parking brake cannot 
be released if the hydraulic system has a failure. (R. at 2074, p. 149) 
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The jury should have been instructed on Hanson's negligent design theory 
and should have had the opportunity to apportion that negligence for its design of the 
truck to ITEC on the special verdict form based on negligent design. Instead, the jury 
was only instructed as to strict liability. Because a negligent design instruction and 
opportunity to apportion fault to ITEC for negligence was appropriate, the trial court's 
failure to give Hanson's requested instruction and failure to list ITEC as a potentially 
negligent party on the special verdict form was in error. 
III. The Trial Court Acted Inconsistently and Committed an Abuse of 
Discretion By Failing to Strike Plaintiffs' Untimely Expert 
Designation and by Granting Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine. 
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike Normandeau's 
untimely designation of its towing expert, Jesse A. Enriquez. The trial court's scheduling 
order required plaintiffs to designate their expert witnesses and provide expert reports by 
March 31, 2005. This deadline was a several month extension from the trial court's 
original designation date. If an expert is not designated or a report not provided, the 
expert is prohibited from testifying. See Arnold v. Curtis. 846 P.2d 1307, 1309-10 (Utah 
1993) (precluding plaintiffs expert who was designated after defendant moved for 
summary judgment and who had not previously designated as an expert). 
Plaintiffs failed to timely designate Mr. Enriquez as a witness. Plaintiffs' 
expert designation deadline was March 31, 2005 - a five month extension from the 
original designation deadline. Plaintiffs, however, failed to designate Jesse A. Enriquez 
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as an expert by this date. Plaintiffs simply submitted Mr. Enriquez's affidavit of August 
10 in conjunction with their memorandum in opposition to Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment. 
In opposing Hanson's motion to strike Enriquez, plaintiffs' primary 
argument was that Enriquez was a rebuttal expert who did not need to be timely disclosed 
or designated. (R. at 1118) Furthermore, plaintiffs argued the Amended Scheduling 
Order contained no date for designation of rebuttal experts, thus relieving them of any 
obligation to timely disclose the identity of a towing expert. (R. at 1120-22) In a 
nutshell, plaintiffs argued that Enriquez's opinions were "classic" rebuttal testimony and 
not part of plaintiffs' case-in-chief. (R. at 1118, 1122) 
In addition to being contrary to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Scheduling Order, plaintiffs' argument fails for three reasons: (A) Hanson never 
designated any experts to testify about towing practices and did not rely on any of its own 
experts to support its motion for summary judgment; (B) under Utah law, rebuttal 
testimony must be disclosed in a timely manner; and (C) as set forth in Hanson's motion 
to strike, Enriquez's opinions were conclusory and not based on personal knowledge of 
facts sufficient to withstand Hanson's motion for summary judgment. 
A. Jesse Enriquez was not a rebuttal expert. 
L Hanson did not provide anything for plaintiffs to rebut. 
In moving for summary judgment, Hanson did not rely on any expert that it 
designated. Instead, Hanson relied plaintiffs' own expert witnesses and known deposition 
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testimony of fact witnesses to argue that plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law. 
Notwithstanding that Hanson did not designate any experts or new evidence in its motion 
for summary judgment, plaintiffs attempted to create issues of fact by submitting a 
previously undisclosed "rebuttal" expert in order to contradict the evidence in the record. 
At some point, parties to protracted litigation are entitled to rely on 
deadlines, plan their litigation strategy based on those deadlines, and make tactical 
decisions based on deadlines and the current state of the evidence. Indeed this concept is 
set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: "[the rules] shall be liberally construed to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Utah R. Civ. P. 
1(a). In order to avoid a Dickensian case like Jamdyce and Jamdyce, courts have adopted 
and enforced scheduling orders to manage and streamline the flow of case through the 
crowded dockets. The Utah Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of 
these rules: "'[the rules are] designed to provide a pattern of regularity of procedure 
which the parties and the courts [can] follow and rely upon.'" Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 
24, T[8, 135 P.2d 861 (quoting Drurv v. Lunceford. 415 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah 1966)). This 
is not a case where plaintiffs did not have ample opportunity to conduct fact and expert 
discovery. The close of fact discovery came nearly 3 1/2 years after the accident occurred 
and nearly 2 1/2 years after the complaint was filed. Furthermore, plaintiffs were 
provided a several month extension in which to designate their expert witnesses. 
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Relying on these deadlines, Hanson timely submitted a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that the facts in evidence and plaintiffs' experts failed to create a 
viable claim against Hanson as a matter of law. Hanson's arguments were based on 
simple principles of negligence: duty, causation, and contributory negligence. Plaintiffs 
cannot reasonably contend these arguments came as a surprise [as Hanson disclosed them 
as affirmative defenses in its answer]. Thus, Hanson's motion for summary judgment did 
not create any new issue or assert new evidence which necessitated a rebuttal expert. The 
trial court abused its discretion in allowing plaintiffs to untimely designate a rebuttal 
expert in opposing Hanson's motion for summary judgment. 
IL A motion for summary judgment tests plaintiffs' ability to 
make a claim as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs argued they did not need to designate a towing expert because his 
testimony was not a part of their case-in-chief. A summary judgment motion sets forth a 
series of facts and argues that based on these facts the moving party is entitled to prevail 
as a matter of law. In other words, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, the 
motion challenges the plaintiffs ability to make its case-in-chief. By presenting 
Enriquez's affidavit in opposition to Hanson's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs 
necessarily are relying on Enriquez to prove its ability to make a prima facie claim. 
"The function of rebuttal testimony is to explain, repel, counteract or 
disprove evidence of the adverse par ty . . . . As such, rebuttal evidence may be used to 
challenge the evidence or theory of an opponent-and not to establish a case-in-chief." 
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Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, 457 F.3d 748, 759 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing timely 
disclosure of expert witness). 
Where plaintiffs' rebuttal expert testified regarding the affirmative fact that 
the design of the truck created a dangerous "stick of dynamite," that Normandeau could 
not appreciate the danger of the situation, and that Normandeau's preparation of the truck 
was non-negligent, his opinion testimony was not rebuttal testimony. (R. at 814) The fact 
that plaintiffs were opposing Hanson's motion for summary judgment does not turn these 
opinions into rebuttal testimony. As stated, a motion for summary judgment tests the 
plaintiffs' ability to make their case-in-chief. The trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing plaintiffs to untimely designate an expert witness in order to oppose Hanson's 
motion for summary judgment. 
B. Utah requires disclosure of rebuttal witnesses. 
Assuming plaintiffs' expert, Jesse Enriquez, was in fact a rebuttal expert, 
Utah law requires disclosure of rebuttal evidence and witnesses. See Roundy v. Staley. 
1999 UT App 229,1fl[8-l3, 984 P.2d 404. With respect to the timely disclosure of 
evidence, Utah law has held the purpose of discovery rules is "'to remove elements of 
surprise or trickery so the parties and the court can determine the facts and resolve the 
issues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as possible.'" Id. at ^ [8 (quoting Ellis v. 
Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 190, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (1967)). In Roundy, the Utah Court of 
Appeals explained when rebuttal testimony must be disclosed: "the nondisclosure of a 
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rebuttal witness is excused only when that witness was unknown and unanticipated; 
known and anticipated witnesses, even if presented in rebuttal, must be identified 
pursuant to a court order, such as a pre-trial order, or to a proper discovery request." Id. 
atf 13 (quoting McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co.. 605 N.E.2d 175, 179 (Ind. 1993)). 
Undoubtedly, plaintiffs will argue Enriquez was unknown and 
unanticipated at the point when Hanson filed its motion for summary judgment. Such an 
argument, however, would eviscerate the rules regarding scheduling orders, timely 
designation, and disclosure of rebuttal evidence. This is a case about an accident that 
occurred while Normandeau, a tow truck driver, was preparing a Ryder truck for towing. 
Enriquez's testimony was intended to establish that Normandeau could not have 
appreciated the danger of failing to check for torque and was not negligent by failing to 
properly check for torque before dropping the drive line. Plaintiff was aware of the 
testimony of Normandeau's co-workers, Kyle Bundy and Landon Jacobson, and should 
have been aware of Hanson's theory of the case. Moreover, Hanson's pleadings set forth 
the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. 
After the close of fact and expert discovery, Hanson moved for summary 
judgment. The dispositive motion cut-off is not the final opportunity for plaintiffs to 
learn about a defendant's theory of the case. Furthermore, the dispositive motion cut-off 
is not an opportunity for plaintiffs to shore up their case by introducing new evidence or 
opinions. At the stage of summary judgment, which occurred after the cut-off for fact 
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and expert discovery, Hanson was entitled to rely on the evidence produced to date 
without fear of new evidence being introduced. 
To use a poker analogy, in moving for summary judgment, Hanson put its 
cards on the table and said, my hand beats your hand. Traditionally, plaintiffs would then 
reveal their cards. The winning hand would prevail. In this case, however, the trial court 
allowed plaintiffs to draw another card after Hanson put its cards on the table. Hanson 
followed the rules of the game, only to have the rules of the game change in midstream. 
In changing the rules of the game, the trial court abused its discretion. 
C. The trial court compounded its previous errors when it granted 
plaintiffs' motion in limine. 
After the trial court allowed Enriquez's testimony, the error and prejudice to 
Hanson was compounded when the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion in limine which 
sought to limit the opinion testimony of Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker. 
Plaintiffs moved to exclude the opinion testimony of supervisor, Bundy and co-worker 
Jacobson on the basis that neither witness was present at the scene when the accident 
occurred. Because of the lack of foundation, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion in 
limine and disallowed this opinion testimony. 
Plaintiffs' expert, however, was allowed to offer opinion testimony at trial 
despite the fact that he also was not present at the accident scene, never trained or met the 
Normandeau, was not designated in a timely manner, and had no additional knowledge of 
proper towing procedures. Furthermore, in contrast to Hanson's witnesses who were not 
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being paid for their opinions and had personal knowledge of Normandeau's training and 
experience, Mr. Enriquez's opinions were not objective. Mr. Enriquez had less 
foundation for his opinions and was being paid to offer his opinions. Nevertheless, 
plaintiffs' expert's opinions were presented to the jury while the supervisor's and co-
worker's un-biased opinions were excluded. 
Since the trial court was disposed to allow the jury to hear Mr. Enriquez's 
opinions, it should have allowed the jury to hear the more probative and unbiased 
testimony of Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker. Because their testimony was 
excluded, the jury was only left with Enriquez's biased and speculative opinions. As 
such, the jury did not hear those witnesses with the most probative testimony on a key 
issue in the case. 
Returning to the poker analogy, not only did the trial court allow plaintiffs 
to draw another card, the trial court effectively took a card out of Hanson's hand. Thus, 
at the close of fact and expert discovery, both parties made the best five card hand they 
could based on the facts in evidence. After the trial court's rulings on Hanson's motion to 
strike and plaintiffs' motion in limine, plaintiffs went to trial with six cards and Hanson 
only had four. The rules of civil procedure should not be enforced in a manner that 
creates an uneven playing field at trial. The trial court abused its discretion and 
committed reversible error. As such, this Court should remand for a new trial which 
corrects the trial court's abuses. 
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D. Plaintiffs' Untimely Expert's Opinions Lack Foundation and 
Are Speculative. 
The trial court erred by allowing plaintiffs' towing expert's opinions to 
defeat its motion for summary judgment. As set forth in Hanson's motion to strike, Mr. 
Enriquez's affidavit does not indicate he has any personal knowledge of any facts. 
Instead, Mr. Enriquez offers nothing more than his opinion on the legal issue of 
causation. Mr. Enriquez offers his "opinion that the untimely death of Dennis 
Normandeau was the result of a set of circumstances . . . . " His opinion is based upon his 
review of depositions, expert reports, and Hanson's motion for summary judgment, not 
upon his personal knowledge of any facts. As such, Mr. Enriquez's testimony lacks any 
personal knowledge and is solely his speculation on what may have occurred. Because it 
lacks a factual basis, however, the trial court erred in allowing it to oppose Hanson's 
motion for summary judgment and erred when it granted plaintiffs' subsequent motion in 
limine to exclude the co-workers' testimony. 
In Jetcraft Corp. v. Flight Safety Int'K the 10th Circuit excluded a human 
factors expert who offered expert opinion that contradicted the pilot's statement of what 
happened during a plane crash, stating: "to come in after the fact as in this case and to 
take into account contrary denials [by the pilot] and, in the absence of any evidence from 
the plaintiff as to what he did, to opine that the event was the inadvertent retraction [of 
the landing gear] by [the pilot] is just professional speculation." Jetcraft Corp. v. Flight 
Safety Int'L 16 F.3d 362, 366 (10th Cir. 1993) (excluding expert's testimony on what 
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pilot might have done to cause crash). Furthermore, an expert's opinion "is nevertheless 
limited by the foundation laid for it. A declaration about causation is inadmissible 'where 
an expert witness has not testified to sufficient facts on which to base his opinion.'" Patey 
v. Lainhart 1999 UT 31,^23, 977 P.2d 1193. 
Those witnesses with the most knowledge of Normandeau, his training, 
and the accident scene have testified that it appeared that Normandeau failed to check for 
torque. None of these witnesses were paid to offer their opinions. In contrast, Mr. 
Enriquez is coming in after the fact and contradicting this testimony. As discussed in 
point C, the trial court's ruling in denying Hanson's motion to strike and in granting 
plaintiffs' motion in limine had the effect of eliminating the testimony that was the most 
objective. The trial court excluded the evidence that had the most probative value, but 
allowed a hired expert without any personal knowledge to offer opinions which 
contradicted the objective testimony. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Hanson's motion to strike Mr. Enriquez's biased and unsubstantiated opinions. 
IV. The Trial Court Erred In Refusing To Grant a New Trial Because of 
Improper and Prejudicial Remarks Made By Plaintiffs Counsel In 
Closing Argument. 
Plaintiffs' counsel made numerous improper, inflammatory and prejudicial 
closing arguments which alone, in some cases, and in total, require a new trial. Judge 
Higginbotham, in Draper v. AIRCCX Inc.. 580 F.2d 91 (3rd Cir. 1978), reversed a jury 
verdict for a plaintiff in a wrongful death suit and remanded the case for a new trial due to 
35 
plaintiffs counsel's misconduct in closing arguments. With respect to closing arguments, 
Judge Higginbotham framed the issue with which this Court must wrestle: 
In reaching this conclusion, we wish to emphasize that we do 
not expect advocacy to be devoid of passion. A life has been 
lost here and the family is entitled to have someone speak 
with eloquence and compassion for their cause. But jurors 
must ultimately base their judgment on the evidence presented 
and the rational inferences therefrom. Thus, there must be 
limits to pleas of pure passion and there must be restraints 
against blatant appeals to bias and prejudice. These bounds of 
conduct are defined by the Code of Professional 
Responsibility and the case law. 
I d at 95. 
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct provide at Rule 3..4(e) that a 
lawyer shall not: 
(e) In trial, elude to any matter that the lawyer does not 
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence, assert personal 
knowledge of facts and issue except when testifying as 
a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness 
of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability 
of a civil litigant or the guilt of innocence of an 
accused; . . . . 
As noted above, it is this proscription, along with case law, that will guide 
this Court's assessment of the prejudicial impact of plaintiffs' counsel's misconduct 
during closing arguments. Appellant asserts that plaintiffs' counsel's arguments were 
prejudicial in the following respects: (A) repeated derogatory comments about defense 
tactics; (B) commentary on the credibility of witnesses and the justness of plaintiffs' 
36 
cause; (C) use of improper reverse commentary to inflame jury's passion and sympathy; 
and (D) commentary on the decision not to call witnesses. 
A. Improper Derogatory Comments About Defense Tactics. 
It is a direct violation of Rule 3.4(e) for a lawyer at trial to allude to any 
matter that is not relevant or to express a personal opinion as to the credibility of a 
witness or a litigant. Plaintiffs' counsel expressly violated that prohibition several times 
during his closing argument. 
In his rebuttal closing argument, plaintiffs' counsel's argument were almost 
exclusively on "defense tactics." (R. at 1782-83, 90) Plaintiffs' counsel leads off by 
remarking that it easier to defend a case than it is to prosecute one because it is so easy 
for the defense to mislead the jury and get the jury off on the wrong foot. (R. at 1782-83) 
Plaintiffs' counsel then goes on to enumerate certain specific defense tactics: (1) mislead 
the jury that the burden of proof is higher than it really is (R. at 1783); (2) blame other 
people for the cause of the accident (R. at 1785); (3) mislead the jury about how the close 
the causal connection should be in order to find liability (R. at 1786); (4) mislead the jury 
by using a red herring approach. (R. at 1789) 
In summarizing some of evidence and damages, plaintiffs' counsel states: 
You know what you've heard here is pathetic. It 
violates one of the most fundamental rules your parents and 
my parents, what we were taught by our mothers and fathers. 
When you grow up as a child Hannah's age, Jake's age. What 
are you taught? Don't be a cry baby. Don't lie. Don't make 
excuses. Own up to your mistakes. Come on, what do we 
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have to do? They will never, the last defense lawyer tactic 
that you've heard here is that no amount of proof is enough. 
There is no amount of proof that I could ever put up given 
their attitude. There would never be enough. I don't buy that. 
You've seen a pathetic display of violations of the most basic 
rules of human relationships. And it is sad to see it in this 
context. It is dishonest. It is disingenuous. It is pathetic. 
Then she says at the end, well there is no basis for, this case is 
not worth 1.2 million dollars? Remember that? That is just 
insulting. . . . 
(R. at 1791-92) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs' counsel's remarks about morality and ethics 
come right up to the line of being a "send a message" argument to the jury - that the jury 
should send a message to companies like Hanson. 
A lawyer should abstain from any personal references to a litigant or 
opposing counsel during argument. Aside from the ethical reasons, it is considered 
improper to provide personal comments about the evidence or to attack the parties. See, 
e.g.. Redish v. State. 525 So.2d 928, 931 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988) (finding prosecutors 
reference to defense counsel's alleged "cheap tricks" was improper); Circle Y of Yokum 
v. Blevins. 826 S.W.2d 753, 758 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Commercial Credit 
Business Loans. Inc. v. Martin. 590 F. Supp. 328, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (counsel's 
comment that behavior is outrageous and horrible and general expressions of indignation 
and outrage "could only serve to lead the jury away from a decision based upon a fair and 
impartial review of the evidence"). 
In Tabor v. O'Grady. 59 N.J. Super. 330 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960), 
the Court found that counsel suggesting that opposing party's case was based upon 
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"trickery" was impermissible. In State v. Lvles, 996 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999), a 
prosecutor stated in closing argument: "How do you explain the keys were in his pockets? 
Police Officer Yates didn't lie. Defense counsel is either confused or she's lying or trying 
to mislead you." Id at 716. The Missouri Appellate Court found this argument to be an 
impermissible commentary on the evidence and witnesses. See id.; see also Maercks v. 
Birchanskv, 549 So. 2d 199 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1989) (improper for plaintiffs counsel to 
make assert his personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness, and thus court reversed 
and remanded for a new trial). 
Plaintiffs' counsel refers to Hanson's defense as pathetic. (R. at 1740, 1791) 
He goes on to say that the defense will try to confuse the jury with "little details" and that 
the case is four years old because no other negligent party exists. (R. at 1740). Hanson's 
counsel objects to this improper suggestion that the length of time the case has been 
pending is somehow related to Hanson's negligence; however, the trial court believes 
such argument is "fair." (R. at 1740-41) Since the trial court had already overruled 
Hanson's objection to these arguments, plaintiffs' counsel takes the pathetic argument 
one step further in his rebuttal. (R. at 1791) Plaintiffs' counsel suggests to the jury that 
he expected Hanson to admit its negligence to the jury, and its failure to do so is pathetic. 
(R. at 1791) He argues that Hanson's theory of its case violates the rules of human 
decency, is dishonest, disingenuous, and pathetic. (R. at 1791). In summary, he states that 
plaintiffs are the only party with "honor, honesty and integrity." (R. at 1793) 
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Rule 3.4 prohibits an attorney from introducing irrelevant information or 
espousing the justness of his client's cause. Plaintiffs' counsel's moral commentary on 
"defense tactics" and Hanson's defense are improper and designed to inflame the passion 
of the jury. Hanson's counsel made an early objection to these references, but was 
overruled by the trial court who deemed such arguments as fair. Hanson's counsel does 
not need to make repeated, futile objections which would only highlight the arguments to 
the jury. Because the moral commentary about Hanson's defense and its integrity are 
improper, the trial court erred in denying Hanson's request for a new trial. 
B. Credibility of Witnesses. 
Plaintiffs' counsel's attack on the credibility of witnesses and the parties are 
grounds for reversal of this verdict and require a remand for a new trial. See, e.g.. 
Commercial Credit Business Loans. Inc. v. Martin. 590 F. Supp. 328, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1984) 
(laudatory comments violate the rule against commenting on the credibility of a witness -
only new trial could cure client's inappropriate arguments); Kaas v. Atlas Chemical Co.. 
623 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (attorney's expression of his personal 
opinion that an expert witness is a liar is misconduct warranting a new trial, and no 
objection is required because such arguments fall squarely within that category of 
fundamental error in which the basic right to a fair trial has been fatally compromised). 
In his closing remarks, plaintiffs' counsel states that certain witnesses lied 
to the jury. (R. at 1784) Counsel also makes a general reference that Hanson has lied in 
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its defense. (R. at 1791) Specifically, plaintiffs' counsel states: "But he lied. He lied 
under oath in his deposition . . . . Well that was a lie. He did do it. There is no other 
rational conclusion." (R. at 1784) Furthermore, plaintiffs' counsel makes repeated 
references that Hanson and Hanson's theory of its defense are dishonest and lack 
integrity, and in contrast, plaintiffs have honor, honesty and integrity. (R. at 1791-93) 
Plaintiffs' counsel's remarks regarding the parties' and witness credibility are plain error 
that require a new trial. 
C. Improper Reverse Commentary. 
Plaintiff uses the reverse commentary tactic. This is exemplified where he 
states that (1) the plaintiffs are not wealthy people (R. at 1723-24, 1728); (2) the plaintiffs 
don't want the jury's pity or sympathy (R. at 1728-29), and (3) plaintiffs don't want them 
to come back with a verdict for the them because she's just a school teacher, has several 
children, and may not make it in the future without some monetary award. (R. at 1728-
30) Appealing to jury sympathy by making references to a party's wealth, or in this case, 
lack thereof is improper. See Draper v. AIRCO. Inc.. 580 F.2d 91, 95 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
As the Third Circuit stated: "justice is not dependent upon the wealth or poverty of the 
parties and a jury should not be urged to predicate its verdict on a prejudice against 
bigness or wealth." Id. Sometimes telling the jury not to do something is just as 
improper as telling the jury to do something. See, e.g.. Loose v. Offshore Navigation. 
Inc.. 670 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs attorney argued during closing that the 
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jury should not put itself in the plaintiffs position, having to work the rest of his life with 
a certain kind of injury, and the court found that the statement was "an effort to influence 
[the jury] to decide the case on the basis of sympathy and bias rather than an objective 
view of the evidence."). 
In addition to the reverse commentary regarding the plaintiffs' need for 
monetary compensation, plaintiffs' counsel also suggests to the jury that plaintiffs will not 
receive the entire amount of the award. (R. at 1725) Specifically, plaintiffs' counsel 
alludes to the fact that the judge will make "adjustments" and "allocations" to any award 
based on "income or liens." (R. at 1725) The clear import of such statements are that 
jury should not be afraid to render a large verdict if they want to properly compensate the 
plaintiff; however, such an award would be based purely on speculation as the jury has no 
idea of what the plaintiff will actually receive. Moreover, plaintiffs' counsel's reference 
to an adjustment of the award based on income is entirely improper. This suggests that 
the Court has the power to adjust the jury award based on the parties' respective incomes, 
which is, of course, a misstatement of the law. 
The effect of plaintiffs' counsel's closing argument was to elicit the jury's 
sympathy and to induce an award based on sympathy and pity, rather than based on the 
facts and governing law. Plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to invoke pity towards 
plaintiffs and to point out that Hanson was a company, not a person, that could afford to 
pay a large verdict. Specifically, plaintiffs' counsel stated: "Don't worry about what the 
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effect is on that company. Hanson Equipment, Inc. is a corporation." (R. at 1729) 
Because of these remarks, plaintiffs' counsel crossed the line from advocacy based on 
evidence and the law to improper argument which played on the jury's pity and sympathy. 
As such, Hanson is entitled to a new trial. 
D. Failure To Call Witness. 
At several points during closing arguments, plaintiffs' counsel makes 
several references to the fact that certain witnesses did not testify in person. (R. at 1738) 
Plaintiffs' counsel states that he could not bring those witnesses to testify, but Hanson 
could have brought them. The clear import of this argument was that Hanson was hiding 
something from the jury. Plaintiffs' counsel stated: "If this company who didn't bring a 
defense forward. Who didn't put a single person on the stand on their behalf to testify." 
(R. at 1746) Plaintiffs' counsel goes on to reference that the president of Hanson did not 
offer any testimony. (R. at 1746) Hanson's counsel objects to this reference and 
indicates that either party could have put Hanson's president on the stand. (R. at 1747) 
The trial court, however, overrules the objection stating that "the Defense did not call Mr. 
Hanson." (R. at 1747) Also, Hanson's counsel objected to plaintiffs' counsel's reference 
to these absence of these witnesses. (R. at 1738-39) 
Although counsel telling the jury that Hanson deliberately chose not to call 
certain witnesses is probably not sufficient to constitute reversible error, under the facts 
of this case and given the cumulative nature of plaintiffs' counsel's misconduct during 
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closing argument, this further instance of inappropriate statements to the jury requires 
reversal and remand for a new trial. 
In reviewing the closing arguments, at several points, Hanson's counsel 
made objections on the record; however, Hanson's counsel did not make objections at 
every point where plaintiffs' counsel made improper remarks. In some cases, the trial 
court overruled Hanson's objection, and Hanson is not required to make repeated, futile 
objections. In this respect, Hanson's counsel is caught in the classic position of being 
between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, Hanson's counsel can make an 
objection to preserve it in the record. On the other, Hanson's counsel runs the risk of the 
objection highlighting the prejudicial remark to the jury and also alienating the jury 
because of the numerous interruptions to plaintiffs' closing. At best, Hanson's counsel's 
objections will be sustained and the Court would issue a curative instruction. From 
Hanson's point of view, however, the court in O'Rear v. Freuhauf Corp.. 554 F.2d 1304, 
1309 (5th Cir. 1977) summed up the situation most succinctly: "You can throw a skunk 
into the jury box and instruct the jurors not to smell it, but it doesn't do any good." 
It was, however, error on the part of plaintiffs' counsel to make such 
outrageous statements, the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for Hanson had plaintiffs' counsel not 
made such outrageous accusations. See State v. Medina Juarez. 2001 UT 79, ^ [18, 34 
P.3d 187 (discussing standards to demonstrate plain error). Indeed, in light of the 
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inflammatory quality and sheer quantity of plaintiffs' counsel's misconduct during 
closing arguments, review is warranted to prevent plain error . See Bradley v. Romeo, 
716 P.2d 227, 228 (Nev. 1986) (recognizing that "[t]he ability of this court to consider 
relevant issues sua sponte in order to prevent plain error is well established"); see also 
Kaas v. Atlas Chemical Co.. 623 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (attorney's 
expression of his personal opinion that an expert witness is a liar is misconduct 
warranting a new trial, and no objection is required because such arguments fall squarely 
within that category of fundamental error in which the basic right to a fair trial has been 
fatally compromised); Draper. 580 F.2d at 97 (where closing argument violated so many 
rules, it is "reasonably probable" that the jury's verdict was influenced by remarks). To 
the extent Hanson failed to object, this Court should review plaintiffs' counsel's closing 
argument for plain error. Due to improper closing remarks, Hanson requests this court 
remand for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, Hanson requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment and remand for entry 
of an order dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Hanson. In the alternative, Hanson 
requests this Court to remand for a new trial with instructions to correct the trial court's 
errors and abuses of its discretion. 
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DATED this / / day of January, 2007. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
/^MELTNDA A. MORGAN 
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Attorneys for Defendant Hanson Equipment, 
Inc. 
46 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
instrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this _jtjv}day of January, 2007, to 
the following: 
Colin P. King 
Paul M. Simmons 
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN 
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NO ADDENDUM IS REQUIRED. 
This appeal does not turn on the interpretation of any constitutional provisions, 
rules or statutes. None of the cited rules are of "central importance" to the appeal. To the 
extent a rule of civil procedure is cited, the relevant portion of the rule is set forth in the 
argument section of the brief. Although this is an appeal from several interim orders from 
the trial court, none of the interim orders provide any basis, details or analysis of the trial 
court's decisions that would aid this Court in its review of the order. Finally, Hanson's 
challenged jury instruction is set forth in full in the argument section of the brief. 
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